allowed to remain free in society after his conviction, subject only to the supervision of a trained officer ahd certain additional requirements. This is done by way of a suspended sentence wherein either the imposition or the execution of the sentence is postponed. Parole, on the other hand, occurs after the criminal has served part of his sentence. It is usually administered by an executive agency rather than the courts. .Confusion begins when one of the conditions imposed on a probationer is that he serve a portion of his sentence before returning to society. Prolonged imprisonment may impede rather than aid the correction of an individual's criminal predispositions 5 since many prisons lack the facilities necessary to treat individual prisoner's needs. 6 Probation, on the other hand, provides the reward of conditional liberty to those who can demonstrate the ability and willingness to act in a lawful manner over a certain period of time (usually five years or less) ? The probationer need never serve a 4 (1953); People v. Jennings, 129 Cal. App.2d 120, 276 P.2d 124 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) . Although this is called "probation", it might be more consistent to treat these situations as judicial recommendations to the parole board. Such a distinction may be more academic than useful due to the common juxtaposition of probatfon and parole in legal theory. See Weihofen, Revoking day in prison. 8 The conditions imposed on his liberty and the guidance afforded by a trained officer provide the necessary control, direction, and encouragement for this rehabilitation process. With this help, the probationer is given the opportunity to correct his anti-social behavior within, rather than apart from, the social context and tensions which may foster problems. This process attempts to facilitate the criminal's re-entry into society as a productive member. 9 In short, the strength of the probation system reflects emphasis on the positive treatment of the criminal within society rather than the punitive separation of him from society. In this way, probation benefits both the probationer and society. 10 Congress and all of the state legislatures have recognized the soundness of this rehabilitative approach by enacting statutes creating probation." Nonetheless, few statutes are specific as to when or how to grant or revoke probation; 12 instead, individual trial courts have exercised broad discretionary powers. 13 As will be seen, this discretion has occasionally been abused and the time has come to make a fresh analysis of the function it serves and of the safeguards available against arbitrary judicial action.
GRANTING PROBATION Procedure
Generally a criminal may be placed on probation or given a suspended sentence after trial, 1 0 In 1966, the cost of supervising a person on probation for one day was only 67; the cost of imprisonment for one day was 87.54, disregarding the added benefits of probationer's income, family support, and avoidance of the prison stigma. AnmN of the sentence is postponed. Under either type, if the probationer abides by the conditions placed on his liberty, he will be released 7 Nonetheless, the distinction between suspended imposition and suspended execution may be significant in determining procedural rights upon revocation of probation. The Supreme Court of the United States has held recently that a probationer has a right to counsel in probation revocation hearings at which a deferred sentence may be imposed." 8 But several lower federal courts have distinguished this case and denied the right to counsel at such hearings when only the execution of the sentence had been deferred.
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The imposition of a sentence after probation revocation is unlike most sentencing situations in that the court has knowledge of defendant's postconviction activities. This may influence the length of the sentence if he has proved to be unresponsive to correctional measures. 0 403 P.2d 701 (1965); People v. Hamilton, 26 A.D.2d 134, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966) ; Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 .
17 If the prisoner does not obey the conditions, he may be imprisoned. Twenty-five years ago in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943) , the Supreme Court indicated that the difference between release and imprisonment was one of "trifling degree." The suspended imposition of sentence is in reality another form of indeterminate sentence, allowing the length of a criminal's sentence to depend on the measure of his improvement. Where the criminal is placed on probation under a suspended imposition of sentence, it is practically [Vol. 60 this result, state courts could impose sentence at trial and only suspend its execution. Even if the same procedural safeguards are subsequently required for revocation of both types of probation, the convicted criminal who chooses probation should have the opportunity of knowing the alternative prison sentence. Such information might aid his rehabilitation by making him more willing to fulfill the conditions of the court's probation order.0
Selection
Because funds and supervisory personnel are limited, it is particularly important to place on probation only those criminals with potential for reform. Many courts use presentence investigation reports as aids in determiningwho shouldbe granted probation.n Although the use of such reports is generally accepted, it is still difficult to determine factors in assessing a person's potential for rehabilitation through conditional liberty.n Four impossible to prove that probationer received a greater sentence upon revocation than he would have received immediately after trial. However, in a few cases of probation under a suspended execution of sentence there have been attempts to raise the sentence which was originally imposed. One federal court in Remer v. Regan, 104 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1939) factors are commonly used in selection: age, prior record, current offense, and psychological stability.N There are also indications that criminals with good family relationships, consistency of occupation, and at least an average education have a better rehabilitation record when placed on probation than those without those characteristics.
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More needs to be known about the factors which establish a criminal's potential for rehabilitation.
Once these factors which influence rehabilitation are isolated and understood, a significant change in the selection criteria may occur. For example, the crime which the individual committed is presently considered a critical factor in selection.
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But the crime is not necessarily a relevant factor; it may be the symptom of certain underlying causes. If the rehabilitation criteria are isolated and recognized, the criminal's propensity for treatment may replace the crime itself as the major factor in selection for probation. As knowledge of proper treatment expands, more individuals may be placed on probation and returned to society as productive members; the prisons can become, "instead of mass custody centers, specialized and professionalized rehabilitation services for the relatively small number of offenders requiring institutional treatment."
Conditions Imposed
Some of the more serious, but as yet unanswered, legal problems in the granting of probation center around the nature of the conditions imposed. Some limitations must be imposed on the broad powers of the granting authority to prevent abuses of discretion.
In People v. Turner,n an individual convicted of the attempted sale of narcotics had been granted probation on the condition that he "immediately go to Buffalo State Hospital and be under care of Dr. Burnett." Probationer obeyed this directive but subsequently left the hospital, reporting to probation supervision on the following day. Almost four months later, probationer was arrested upon order of the trial judge and charged with vio- This youth continues to demonstrate a sincere, cooperative, and mature attitude regarding the conditions of his probation imposed and no reports of misconduct or the use of narcotics have been received.u
At the probation revocation hearing some evidence indicated that probationer was arrested because he, a Negro, was seeing a white girl and the girl's parents swore that he was inducing her to use drugs. The original trial judge conducted the hearing, despite suggestions that he disqualify himself and found that there had been a breach of conditions which compelled probation revocation. The appellate court reversed the probation revocation and held that the appellant had the right to a definitive statement of probation conditions and also the right to appeal: 'Thus, in finality, although the -probation officer conceded on cross-examination that perhaps both he and appellant hadmisunderstood the terms of probation, the trial judge either had a mental reservation that apbellant should not leave the hospital without the consent of the named doctor or this unexpressed, condition was formulated and implemented to end the association between appellant and a female not of his race.
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Justice was done in this case, but the danger posed by vague probation conditions is evident. In more general terms, Turner exemplifies the problem raised when the authority that grants probation has the power to impose and interpret whatever conditions it may choose.
Since ) txecute a recogmzance in accordance -with the provisions of Article 110 of this Code. (b), A person admitted to probation mayr be subject to the following conditions:
(1) Imprisoned in a place of confinemefit ,other than a penitentiary for a period not to exceed one year and in no event-tq exceed the maximum penalty for the offense. , (2) Pay within a period set by the court a fine not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense. [Vol. 60 held as a valid condition for his probation. ' Some courts have attempted to further their regional interests by exiling probationers."
In addition, a probationer may not be adequately informed of the conditions. A number of probation revocations have been overturned for vague conditions. 3 9 But revocations based on implied conditions 4 0 or on the requirements of the probation statute' have been upheld despite the fact that a probationer was not explicitly informed of them, These defects are particularly serious in an area of ihd law which is devoted to rehabilitation and treatment of offenders. It would-seem difficult to engender the proper respect for the laws in an individual who is being treated unfairly by them. His acceptance of probation as an alternative to imprisonment gives no justification fdr conditions which do not promote hig rehabilitation.
In order to prevent these defects-from recurring, some 'ttitudes toward probation must be altered, ad the discretionary power of the courts must'be limited. Probation must no longer be viewed as quasi-judicial-or administrative in nature.4 2It is part of the criminal law, andthe-types of-conditioris that may be imposed should be brought into keeping with it. This calls for action by the federal and-state legislitures or at least by the courts through judge-made law. Although probation is a "favor, not a 'c6ntract",4 limitations might be stated mo~t dearly in contract te rminology. conditions should be explicit, reasonable, and 'for an expressed maximum term.
The carry a potential danger of abuse which-may lead the probationer to believe that.he has.been tricked even when the granting authority honestly concludes that 'the conditions which he intended to impose have been breached. These possible results are inconsistent -with the goal of -rehabilitation.
Vague conditions also, cause the courts-problems of interpretation. Some 'courts have narrowly interpreted them so as to preserve the effectiveness-of the restrictions as to other conduct. 50 'Unfortunately, this does not solve the problems raised by such a cofidition. A better approach, taken by at least one court,9 would be to invalidate thei condition altogether. This would probably deter theirfurther use and largely eliminate the problem.
condition to act in a way "that will lead to his rehabilifation"). Conditions should also be reasonbaly related to the purposes of the probation statutes 5 2 and should not be dependent on events beyond probationer's control.Y Nor should they be so exceedingly harsh that they unnecessarily encourage a breach or alter the fundamental force of the program from one of positive reform to one of negative coercion. Finally, the conditions should be imposed for a fixed term during which they should not be altered without cause. Some state statutes permit courts to extend the terms and alter the conditions 55 to any requirements that might have been originally imposed. Such should not be done solely on the suggestion of a supervisory officer, 56 but should take effect only after a thorough investigation and clear expression of the cause for the change. These limitations on the discretionary powers of the granting authorities would provide a broad framework within which their discretion could operate and, at the same time, prevent many possible abuses. The probationer should: not be made to feel that he is at the complete mercy of the supervisory officials or the granting authority. He should be helped to understand fully the conditions that have been imposed on him. But with the exception of these conditions, he should be made to feel that he is a full member of society who can rely on the protections and privileges of the law.
There is still great discretion as to the conditions that might be imposed to promote rehabilitation effectively. These restrictions should in some way be related to the individual and the crime 52 People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App.2d 663, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967) §77-35-17 (1953 committed.u For example, if the individual used an automobile in committing the crime of which he was initially convicted, probation might be granted on the condition that his driver's license be withheld. If he needed a car in his occupation, however, limited use of the automobile might be appropriate. But care should be taken, at least in the early stages of probation, not to make the conditions so difficult to enforce (from the standpoint of the supervisory officer's ability to know whether they have been breached or not) that the individual is tempted to disobey them, Furthermore, if the conditions are breached, the granting authority might be well-advised to stiffen the conditions rather than revoke probation.
In addition to the above limitations, constitutional provisions may be invoked as further limitations on the discretionary powers of those who grant probation. In 1935 the Supreme Court of the United States stated that a probationer has no constitutional right to be granted or to retain his probation." The Court characterized probation as merely legislative grace, a privilege but not a right. This opinion has been widely cited in subsequent cases 59 and has formed a further basis for the assertion that the legislatures had vested the courts with discretionary powers in this area. 60 At least five states have departed from this traditional view, however, and have found that their state constitutions did give certain rights (mostly procedural rights at a revocation proceeding) to those placed on conditional liberty.' With the growth of this opposing authority, many of the conditions which were previously deemed permissible are now being questioned. Conditions requiring sterilization 2 or the "donation" of blood to the Red CrossO could be argued to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punish- [Vol. 60 ment. 4 A convicted criminal's acceptance of probation might not constitute waiver of this right when faced with the coercive alternative of a long prison term. Since the purpose of probation is not punitive, one might have difficulty establishing that such a condition is "punishment" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
65 However, where the condition is extremely harsh and lacks significant rehabilitative value, it would seem that the defendant is put in the position of choosing between different forms of punishment. He then should be able to attack the condition as unconstitutional.
The condition that requires the criminal to refrain from committing any further crimes during his term of probation might also be questioned. This condition can be valid on its face and yet be used to accomplish results of questionable constitutionality. Because a lower standard of proof controls proceedings for the revocation of conditional liberty, 66 the probationer may be sent to prison by a revocation proceeding even though he is found innocent of the new crime in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 7 But, since the re-imprisonment may be interpreted as merely an enforcement of the original crimes it is doubtful that this practice or the condition which permits it will be found unconstitutional. Furthermore, at least from the viewpoint of preventing abuses or errors, the new crime may be regarded as no different than any other breach of conditions. The possibility that an authority may conclude that an individual App. 610, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1945) , appeal dismissed, 388 Ill. 248, 57 N.E.2d 755 (1944) ; State v. Greer, 173 N.C. 759, 92 S.E. 147 (1917) . As indicated by these cases and People v. White, 98 Ill. App.2d 1, 239 N.E.2d 854 (1968) , the criminal might never be tried for the new crime since he can be imprisoned, supposedly for his original crime, with less proof in a probation revocation proceeding.
6
8 See cases cited in note 67, supra.
breached his conditions even though he did not, in fact, do so is an ever-present and inescapable danger. This can be minimized only by affording greater procedural safeguards to a probationer at revocation proceedings.
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REvOKING PROBATION Whereas the grant of probation is designed to promote rehabilitation, the purpose of probation revocation is to protect society and to punish the probationer, when he has violated one of the conditions placed on his freedomY° In effect, the court reverses its earlier decision granting probation on the pragmatic grounds that the prophylactic need so outweighs the rehabilitative benefits that no mere alteration of the probation conditions would sufficiently control the probationer's anti-social tendenciesE Prison then becomes the only solution.
There are at least three reasons why there should be less discretion in revoking probation than in denying it originally. First, where there is informal procedure and judicial discretion, there is also a greater chance for error and abuse. Improper denial of probation would seem to have a less detrimental effect on a criminal than improper revocation of probation. If a convicted criminal deserves probation and is denied it, then society has lost an opportunity for more effective rehabilitation of this person; if a probationer is imprisoned for an alleged violation of conditions which, in fact, never occurred, then society has also discouraged a reformer from rehabilitation, inducing frustration and resentment in him. Thus, the risk of thwarting the rehabilitative purpose of probation would be less if discretionary power were restricted ir probation revocation proceedings.
Second, a program of rehabilitation suited to a particular criminal must depend on so many factors 69 A condition requiring the criminal to make restitution for the damage caused by his crime, even though there has been no claim and no adjudication of causation or damages, might also be violative of the individual's due process rights. People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) ; State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939 for determining the proper post-trial disposition that the authority may require discretionary powers. But the violation of a probation condition is an objective fact which should be determined by a more standardized method. Only after a breach of conditions has been established does discretionary power once again become appropriate to decide how to rehabilitate the individual.
Third, if probation accomplishes its purpose of rehabilitation, 72 then it is not so much a favor or grace to criminals as it is a benefit to the state itself. In seeking to gain this benefit, the state should have the corresponding duty not to treat probationers unfairly, particularly after the probationer, in reliance on his status, has actually reformed. The surest way to do this is to provide procedural protection to probationers at probation revocation proceedings.
The need for some procedural safeguards at probation revocation procedings has been generally accepted. Although early probation statutes appear to have followed the loose discretionary approach, The Court: You got into some sort of a drunken brawl? The Defendant: No. They say I was drunk. The Court: Your wife has never come out here and your children are still back in Chicago, is that right? The Defendant: Sure. The Court: Well, because of the serious nature of your offense, and because the Court specifically admonished you that you were not under any circumstances to use intoxicating liquors and because you rewarded the consideration that was given you by going out and getting drunk within five days after your release, your probation is revoked.
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In California there is neither a constitutional nor statutory right to notice and hearing preceding revocation of probation.
4 Probation can be revoked on the report of the probation officer alone. 5 Of course, when a hearing is held, it may be summary in nature, 86 the probationer having no right to present or cross-examine wituessesY Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary.P The right to counsel is recognized where probation was granted before sentence was pronounced. 8 9 In other California cases, the right to retained counsel appears uncertain, 0 and the right to assigned counsel is not recognized in every court. -200, 15-200.1 (1965) (notice of charges and "a reasonable time for the defendant to prepare his defense"); TEm. CODE §40-2907 (1956 ) (notice, right to counsel, "right to introduce testimony").
91 hearing is required by 18 U.S.C. §3653 (1964) , which provides that the probationer shall be "taken before the court", and by N.Y. Cans. Pxoc. §935 (McKinney 1968) which requires that the probationer shall have "An opportunity to be heard" by the revoking authority. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953) . CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.2 (1954 , on the other hand, which provides that the authorities shall arrest a probationer and "bring him before the court", does not require a hearing. I_ re Davis, 37 Cal.2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951 Even if the legislature or courts of a jurisdiction were persuaded to afford all of the aforementioned. procedural safeguards, probationers would stilt not be adequately protected. The standard of proof at a probation revocation hearing is often low, requiring only evidence which "reasonably satisfies" the court. 8 The probation officer's report may be conclusive of probationer's improper activity" even though clouded by prejudice and error. 100 Furthermore, the probationer is not warned of his constitutional or statutory rights, and his failure to exercise certain procedural rights at the probation revocation hearing may constitute a waiver of them 01 A majority of the jurisdictions. do not afford probationers the right to subpoena. witnesses or to obtain the appointment of counsel, if indigent.' 0 ' If the individual cannot appeal his.
OSm. REv. STATS. §137.550(2) (1961); VT. STATs. ANNtit. 28, §1015 (1958 ; W. VA. CoD §62-12-19 (1966) . As stated by Sklar, supra note 76, at 188, "state and, lower federal court decisions are legion which stress the informality of the hearing granted by their statutes". Whether the governing statute expressly provides for an informal hearing or not, cases which deny further procedural safeguards for probationers must advocate such as the only alternative. But one could argue that even a "summary hearing" must imply a meaningful opportunity for an effective appearance. Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145,427 P.2d 1020 . Problems may arise where probation is revoked because of probationer's connection with a new crime. Since probation revocation hearings require a lesser degree of proof and apply more relaxed standards of evidence, a new criminal charge may cause probation revocation even though probationer is acquitted of the charge. See People v. Kuduk, 320 Ill. App. 610, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1943) [Vol. 60' probation revocation, then he must seek a writ of habeas corpus and certain procedural irregularities reviewable on appeal cannot be raised at the ensuing proceeding l 0
If appeal is permitted, the state is only required to introduce some evidence in order to achieve an affirmance of the revocation,1 4 whereas it is usually necessary for the probationer to establish that the trial court abused its wide discretion in order to obtain a reversal. 00 It is rare for an appellate court to make such a finding 6 In short, the use of discretionary powerunchecked by procedural protections can prevent probationers from presenting a valid defense at a probation revocation proceeding and statutes have not gone far enough to change this.
Constitimonal Due Process Arguments
In many cases where liberty has been revoked, the limited nature of the statutory rights have led probationers to assert a denial of their constitutional right to due process of law. Many theories have been advanced to explain that the due process clause is inapplicable to probation revocation10°P robation is considered by some a legislative grace or privilege and not a constitutionally protected 1 07 See note 64. right;," s the probationer has entered into a contract with the state whereby his acceptance of probation constitutes a waiver of due process rights l Other theories are that probation is not different from imprisonment because the probationer remains within the constructive custody of the court,nO and that probation revocation is not a "criminal prosecution" In giving probationer the constitutional rights which he had and exhausted at trial." Such justifications are of questionable validity, as will be shown. It is beyond the scope of this article to establish which procedural protections should attach at probation revocation hearings. Hopefully, once courts realize the superficial quality of past theories they will engage in a more thoughtful analysis of this problem.
The theory most frequently used to deny the due process contentions of probationers is the right-privilege distinction adopted by the Supreme Court of the United Staes in Escoe v. Zerbst"' wherein the Court stated:
... [W]e do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose 4 Yet probation should not be characterized as only a mere privilege. Probation provides an alternative method for the state to deal with criminals. It is mutually beneficial and is only granted 108E.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937); Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294 , 232 N.W. 798 (1930 People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912 ; State ex rd. lenks v. Municipal Court of City of St. Paul, 197 Minn. 141, 266 N.W. 433 (1936); Shum v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966) ; State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 154 S.E.2d 53 (1967) ; In re Weber, 75 Ohio App. 206, 61 N.E.2d 502 (1945) . 1 0 9Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); Johnson v. Walls, 155 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937) Our courts have never taken the view that it is a mere matter of favor or grace to admit a defendant to probation. When an order to that effect is entered by a court, the court has satisfied itself that the defendant is not likely to again engage in an offensive or criminal course of conduct and that the public good does not require that the defendant shall suffer the penalty provided by law.... The fact that a person has been adjudged guilty of a criminal offense and subsequently granted probation should not deprive him of a fair, orderly hearing according to accepted judicial principles and recognized standards of procedure when it is sought to terminate that order. When an order granting probation has been entered and the court has imposed the conditions upon which defendant may be at liberty, the defendant has a right to rely thereon and as long as he complies with those conditions his liberty of action or freedom should not be restricted" 8 
[emphasis added]
A probationer's status can only be revoked upon a breach of conditions;-," it cannot be revoked arbitrarily.
1 Thus, the probationer does possess certain rights which the incarcerated non-probationer does not possess. The different procedural implications of seeking to gain and seeking to continue a status have, for example, beenrecognized in the economic "privileges" cases.' Revocation of the right to practice law raises entirely different and mre' substantial problems than were involved Other cotirts have denied procedural protections to a criminal from the time that he accepts probation to the time that he is released, arguing that the probationer waives his constitutional claims at the time of, probation by entering into a contract with the state whereby he agrees tq perform certain conditionsuO Although the contract theory has been approved in subsequent caseA before state courts,12 the Supreme Court rejected it in Burns, describing probation as a "favor not a contract".
1 '2 Particularly in jurisdictions where a convicted' criminal must consent to probation 34 the alternative of imprisonment would seem to be a sufficient coercive force to invalidate any such idea of a contractual waiver.m But the right against arbitrary revocation provides additional protection to the probationer in jurisdictions that still espouse waiver theories. For reasons of accuracy and policy, the terms "privilege," "grace," and "favor" should apply to the sentencing court's discretion in granting probation and not to the continuance of probationer's conditional liberty. At the very least the terms are without value in this context because probation cannot be characterized as a mere privilege.
Even if probation can be properly characterized as a privilege, such a characterization has little, if any, analytical significance. The right-privilege distinction merely restates legal conclusions previously made. It presumes the conclusion in its premises and adds no justification of its own. The theory gives no insight into either constitutional rights or legislative intention. Such a theory certainly should not be dispositive of the issue whether probationer shall have the opportunity to justify his continued conditionalliberty.
Even granting the value of the right-privilege distinction at the time of Escoe, serious question may be raised as to its applicability today. The judiciar has recently recognized that substantive rights are of little value without procedural methods which enable their presentation 3 Pro-cedural rights have been extended to both pretriall i and post-conviction 2 processes. Although the right-privilege distinction previously enjoyed great favor in the license and welfare benefit cases, the Supreme Court of the United States h1as required protection in those cases despite the distinction, 13 apparently recognizing that there is no absolute distinction between "rights" and "privileges," these being simply different degrees of protection 1 4 In short, constitutional claims should not be denied on the basis of such a fictitious polarization of social concerns, designed to perpetuate the satus quo and wholly lacking in analytical value. Finally, even if the right-privilege distinction were applied most strongly to treat a probationer as merely a prisoner with conditional liberty, constitutional language would be less warped and policy would: be better served if procedural protections were granted probationers. Since probation did not exist at common law' 1 3 and since prisoners were never afforded any of the procedural advantages now sought by probationers, it could, be argued that the creation of an opportunity for probation by the legislatures or the courts did not intend to afford the probationer any additional constitutional rights. But the similarities of probation and imprisonment dd not justify this conclusion' 36 It is true that the probationer has no more constitutional rights than the prisoner at the moment of sentencing. However, having been granted a liberty which the prisoner does not have, the probationer is in a position to assert certain consitutional rights which the prisoner cannot. As one writer has observed:
... it is suggested that the freedom of action which a probationer enjoys prior to revocation is sufficiently extensive that it should be considered "liberty" within the meaning of a due process clause, either by viewing the granting of probation as a restoration of a part of the liberty of which the offender, had duly been deprived by his conviction and by then viewing the revocation of probation as a deprivation of the restored liberty, or by theorizing that the offender was deprived of only part of his liberty when his conviction resulted in his being put on probation and that incarceration upon revocation of probation represents a further deprivation of libertyis'
Courts have advanced two arguments against this. Some have contended that the probationer is not actually at liberty but rather is under "constructive custody" by means of an "extension of the prison walls." I Such excess fictionalizingflouts the common sense. A probationer's liberty is incomparably closer to the "unconditional" liberty which law-abiding citizens enjoy than to imprisonment.
Other courts have distinguished probation revocation proceedings from "criminal prosecutions," thereby obviating the constitutional requirements of the latter."' Where the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence in placing a person on probation, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected this argument and condemned the denial of the right to counsel as unconstitutional 0 This protection should also be required when there has been a suspended execution of sentence. Despite subsequent cases to the contrary in state and lower federal courts,' 4 ' there is no valid distinction between the two types of sentencing because a probationer's liberty is at stake in either case. Furthermore, merely providing procedural protection at immediate post-conviction sentencing may be insufficient. Those granted probation normally would receive at least as short a sentence as others because of their capacity for rehabilitation. Yet they may receive a longer sentence from a judge who is aware that it will only be served upon the commission of a further offense in violation of the probation conditions he prescribes. 42 No such formalistic distinction between imposition and execution of sentence should result in the imprisonment of a probationer for post-trial acts or omissions of which he was never convicted. On the other hand, a few state courts have held that a probationer does have a constitutional right to certain procedural protections before his status can be revoked 4 They have referred to probation as a "valuable right" 144 which probationer "should be able to rely upon" 1 45 so long as he obeys the conditions of his liberty. Several other state courts have referred to the probationer's possession of certain "rights" in regard to his status. 146 The policy arguments often weigh heavily in the probationer's favor and some courts have stated that procedural rights "may be desirable" even while denying probationer's claim.' 0 Such concessions are significant when determining whether certain due process rights attach since this determination has often rested on rather pragmatic policy considerations. 14 8
Because of the pragmatic character of the due process clause, the conclusion that the clause applies to probation revocation proceedings does not dispose of the problem of which procedural rights are thereby guaranteed to the probationer. For example, except where there is an issue as to the identity of defendant and the person originally sentenced,"4 no court has stated that probationer has a right to trial by jury at his revocation proceeding.' The due process clause need not change this result: a jury is not necessarily required merely because other procedural rights are. Some courts have gone beyond this and stated that affording any additional procedural rights will cause endless delay and will overburden the courts.i 5 But it is doubtful that any solution would be more burdensome than the present confusion, especially since the practical effect on the courts of requiring some further procedural rights as a matter of due process would probably not be great. In light of the fact that a majority of the states already recognize probationer's right to a hearing, notice of the charges against him, counsel, the presentation of evidence and witnesses, cross-examination of those witnesses testifying against him, and appeal,"' it would not appear that a constitutional recognition of these rights would cause substantial turmoil. Nor would it seem that an extension of similar rights to those who have no knowledge of them to make the realities of probation more consistent with its goals and to eliminate much of the error, uncertainty, confusion, and geographic inequity which presently prevails.
CONCLUSION
Discretionary power performs a necessary function in the implementation of probation. The imposition of individualized conditions is probation's peculiar strength. At present, it is largely the experience of the personnel, rather than the framework of the system, that makes probation work. Hopefully the gathering of research and statistical data will enable probation to become a behavioral science, with improved techniques and guidelines for supervision. But at least for now the states and federal government should take a step in this direction by placing and enforcing limitations on the conditions that can be imposed on probationers. In this way some of the abuses and errors of the system can be eliminated.
No mere limitations, however, will justify the place of discretionary power in the factual determinations of a probation revocation proceeding. A fair and just disposition of individuals can only be achieved by eliminating discretionary power and affording appropriate procedural protections to probationers. (Holmes, J., dissenting) . persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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2 dealt with electronic surveillance which is subject to the dictates of this Amendment whether or not there is an actual physical intrusion of the premises for the "Constitution protects people-and not simply 'areas' ". This provision is a bar to the "uninvited ear" and allows persons to assume that the words they speak in confidence "will not be broadcast to 2394 U.S. 
